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INSURANCE LAW SURVEY
INTRODUCTION
During the 1993-94 survey period, the Tenth Circuit addressed a variety
of insurance issues. Regional Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.'
gave the Tenth Circuit an opportunity to rule on the application of a "pollution
exclusion" contained in a comprehensive general liability ("CGL") insurance
policy.' In Regional Bank, the court departed from typical pollution exclusion
issues and focused instead on the definition of "irritant" or "contaminant" as
contained in the pollution exclusion of a CGL policy
In Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co.,4 the Tenth Circuit
applied Oklahoma law and held that Oklahoma public policy prohibits liability
insurance from covering punitive damages except where the insured has been
held liable under the principles of vicarious liability. In Magnum Foods, the
Tenth Circuit also addressed the issue of punitive damages and insurance bad
faith, holding that a jury should not consider a settlement payment for punitive
damages claim by the insured in determining any compensatory award on a
bad faith claim against the insurer.'
The Tenth Circuit separately addressed the assessment of punitive damag-
es against an insurance company acting in bad faith in Thompson v. State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co.6 In Thompson, the court denied an award of puni-
tive damages because State Farm legitimately believed it had no obligation to
honor the plaintiffs' claim.7
1. 35 F.3d 494 (10th Cir. 1994).
2. At the completion of the survey period and after the writing of this survey, the Tenth
Circuit again ruled on a pollution exclusion in Red Panther Chem. Co. v. Insurance Co. of Pa., 43
F.3d 514 (10th Cir. 1994). This case involved a "total pollution exclusion," which the court also
referred to as a third generation pollution exclusion. The Tenth Circuit found the critical inquiry to
be whether the total pollution exclusion was ambiguous when applied to the facts of that case. The
question was whether the word "escape" in the exclusion was "meant to include the expulsion of a
container of pollutants from a moving vehicle." Finding the provision to be ambiguous, the court
reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the insurer. On remand, as
the total pollution exclusion involved in this case has not been subjected to extensive litigation
like the other pollution exclusions, the district court must explore the intent and factual back-
ground of the exclusion and then determine whether the facts fall within the intended scope of the
exclusion. Id. at 517-19.
3. Regional Bank, 35 F.3d at 498.
4. 36 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1994).
5. Id. at 1506.
6. 34 F.3d 932 (10th Cir. 1994).
7. Id. at 943; see also Willis v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 42 F.3d 607, 615 (10th Cir. 1994)
(holding that while there was sufficient evidence for the bad faith claim to survive a summary
judgment motion, there was no showing of fraud, oppression, or malice to also allow the issue of
punitive damages to go to the jury).
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I. POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSES IN COMPREHENSIVE GENERAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE POLICIES
A. Background
The comprehensive general liability ("CGL") insurance policy has tradi-
tionally provided businesses and governmental entities the broadest coverage
available For over forty years, the standard form CGL policy has been a
mainstay for commercial liability protection.9 The CGL policy furnishes
insureds with broad protection against third-party liability claims and the re-
sulting sums they become legally obligated to pay."
Prior to 1966, CGL policies typically provided coverage for property
damage and bodily injury "caused by accident."" According to insurers, the
"accident" language was intended to provide coverage for a boom event, or
one that was instantaneous and unintended. 2 Most courts rejected this read-
ing and interpreted "accident" in the CGL policy to provide coverage for
unintended injuries, even those not occurring instantaneously. 3 In 1966, the
National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters ("National Bureau"), and other
similar insurance industry drafting and rating organizations, revised the CGL
policy to provide coverage for liability caused by an "occurrence."' 4 An oc-
currence was defined as unintended or unexpected damage, including continu-
ous or repeated exposure to conditions.' The revision was an effort by the
insurance industry to expand the scope of coverage afforded by the courts.
6
Thus, both accidents and gradual exposures were covered as long as the dam-
age was unexpected or unintended. The insurance industry presented the revi-
sion to each state's insurance commissioner, all of whom subsequently ap-
proved the new policy form. Most, if not all, American insurers use the same
CGL policy language making litigation over these policies important to all
insurers and insureds.
7
8. INSURANCE CLAIMS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES 4 (Lynne M. Miller & Mary J.
Mallonee eds., 1989).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 5.
11. Id.; see also Brian J. Coyle & Harwood Lloyd, The Drafting History and Regulatory
History Debate: The Pollution Exclusion from the Insurer's Perspective, in 2 ENVIRONMENTAL
INSURANCE COVERAGE AND LITIGATION 1994, at 109, 118 (PLI Comm. Law & Practice Course
Handbook Series No. A-691, 1994); James A. Hourihan, Insurance Coverage for Environmental
Damage Claims, 15 FORUM 551, 552 (1979-80).
12. Coyle & Lloyd, supra note 11, at 118; Wondie Russell et. al., Insurers, Policyholders
Fight for the Last Word, NAT'L LJ., Dec. 14, 1992, at 32, 32.
13. INSURANCE CLAIMS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES, supra note 8, at 5; Russell et. al.,
supra note 12, at 32.
14. INSURANCE CLAIMS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES, supra note 8, at 5; Russell et. al.,
supra note 12, at 32.
15. Coyle & Lloyd, supra note 11, at 118-19.
16. INSURANCE CLAIMS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES, supra note 8, at 5.
17. The proliferation of similar suits in each circuit over the pollution exclusion evidences
the importance of the litigation. See, e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor Serv., Inc.,
40 F.3d 146 (7th Cir. 1994); Lumbermens Mut. Casualty Co. v. S-W Indus., Inc., 39 F.3d 1324
(6th Cir. 1994); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Warwick Dyeing Corp., 26 F.3d 1195 (1st Cir.
1994); Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. Tonka Corp., 9 F.3d 51 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1834 (1994); Intel Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 952 F.2d 1551 (9th Cir. 1991).
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In 1970, due to various environmental disasters and the rise of public
sentiment against polluters, the insurance industry drafted the "pollution exclu-
sion clause," which was specifically designed to exclude knowing polluters
from coverage. The pollution exclusion clause returned coverage for pollut-
ing events to the "caused by accident" basis.' 9 The exclusion accomplished
this purpose by expressly barring pollution coverage, except for injuries or
damages arising out of "sudden and accidental" pollution discharges."
In light of early cases that interpreted the "sudden and accidental" pollu-
tion exclusion as ambiguous, the insurance industry acted in the early 1980s to
replace it with an absolute pollution exclusion that eliminated the sudden and
accidental exception."' In 1986, the ISO 2 placed the absolute pollution ex-
clusion in its standard CGL policy.23 However, the sudden and accidental
pollution exclusion policies continue to create massive amounts of litigation. 4
Many of these policies, purchased years ago, continue to provide coverage
for sudden and accidental pollution. Pollution is not generally discovered until
random tests reveal a polluting event that may have occurred years earlier.
Through scientific testing, a fairly accurate estimation may be obtained regard-
ing how long the pollution has been occurring and when it first began. For
example, in the leakage from an underground gasoline storage tank, hydrolo-
gists can estimate how long the pollution has been present by the distance the
gas traveled and the amount present. Thus, an initial polluting event that oc-
curred in 1980, may have been discovered only recently. The policy in effect
in 1980 would be the one to which the insured would look for coverage. Most
of the policies at this time had the sudden and accidental pollution exclusion.
Because the standard CGL policy does not define the terms "sudden and
accidental,"25 the overwhelming majority of litigation surrounding the pollu-
tion exclusion has been based upon these words.26  The insurance industry
18. See MITCHELL L. LATHROP, INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CLAIMS §
3.07[1]-[2], at 3-82 to -83 (1994); INSURANCE CLAIMS FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGES, supra
note 8, at 5; Coyle & Lloyd, supra note 11, at 119; Russell et. al., supra note 12, at 32.
19. Coyle & Lloyd, supra note 11, at 119.
20. Id. The 1970-Form or "sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion reads:
This Policy Shall Not Apply:
To bodily injury or property damage arising out of a discharge, dispersal,
release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals,
liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants
into or upon the land, the atmosphere or any watercourse or body of water; but
this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is
sudden and accidental.
LATHROP, supra note 18, § 3.07[2][a].
21. Id. § 3.07[3].
22. The ISO, or Insurance Services Office, is an industry consortium organization that pro-
vides basic, standardized insurance policies and coverage options. JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTER-
PRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 10.5, at 298 n.1 (1994).
23. Id.
24. See id. § 3.07[l]; Russell et. al., supra note 12, at 32.
25. LATHROP, supra note 18, § 3.07[2l[b][i].
26. See Russell et. al., supra note 12, at 32. The Tenth Circuit, prior to Regional Bank, has,
for the most part in litigation involving the pollution exclusion, only had occasion to discuss the
"sudden and accidental" exception. See, e.g., United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrison
Grain Co., 999 F.2d 489 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the term "sudden and accidental" in a
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argues that "sudden" provides a temporal component, requiring that the dis-
charge began abruptly or was short in duration." The insured policyholders
argue that the phrase "sudden and accidental" is ambiguous,28 and as such,
the policy should be construed in favor of the insured.29 The policyholders
further argue that the phrase is merely a restatement of the "expected or in-
tended" language contained in the definition of "occurrence."3 °
Though the debate over the proper interpretation of the pollution exclusion
focuses primarily on the meaning of "sudden and accidental," a side debate
has emerged over what qualifies as a pollutant or contaminant. This side de-
bate has occurred in the context of a pollution exclusion3 and an absolute
pollution exclusion.3 2 In most cases it is assumed that a pollutant was dis-
charged.3 In some situations, however, it may be difficult to decide what
constitutes a pollutant.
In Titan Holdings Syndicate, Inc. v. City of Keene,34 the court held that
excessive light and noise were not within an exclusion that defined a pollutant
as any liquid, solid, gaseous, or thermal irritant. Although the court indicated
that it may be possible for excessive light and noise to be irritants, they were
not liquid, solid, gaseous, or thermal irritants. 35 As irritant was undefined, the
court used it in conjunction with the term pollutant. Therefore, although some-
thing could be an irritant, it also had to meet the definition of pollutant in
order for the exclusion to apply.'
In Staefa Control-System, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance
Co.,3  the insured claimed that petroleum products did not qualify as pollut-
ants. The court noted that although there was "no controlling case law on this
point," there was no merit in the argument.38 The court stated that Staefa's
claim "belied both ... science and common sense," and held that petroleum
was an environmental contaminant or irritant.39
In City of Salina v. Maryland Casualty Co.,' the court concluded there
pollution exclusion has an objective temporal meaning); Anaconda Minerals Co. v. Stoller Chem.
Co., 990 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that where the discharge was gradual and intended,
the pollution exclusion barred coverage even where actual contamination was not expected or
intended).




31. See, e.g., Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. City of Pittsburg, 768 F. Supp. 1463 (D. Kan.
1991), affd sub nom., Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins. Co. v. City of Pittsburg, 987 F.2d
1516 (10th Cir. 1993).
32. See, e.g., Staefa Control-System Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 847 F. Supp.
1460 (N.D. Cal. 1994), amended on recons., 875 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
33. LATHROP, supra note 18, § 3.07[2][a], at 3-84.
34. 898 F.2d 265 (Ist Cir. 1990).
35. Id. at 268; see also Titan Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 27 Cal. Rptr.2d 476 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994) (holding that debris, although both a solid and waste, was not a contaminant).
36. See Titan Holdings Synd., Inc. v. City of Keene, 898 F.2d 265, 268-69 (1st Cir. 1990).
37. 847 F. Supp. 1460, 1471 (N.D. Cal. 1994), amended on recons., 875 F. Supp. 656 (N.D.
Cal. 1994).
38. Id. at 1471.
39. Id.
40. 856 F. Supp. 1467, 1478 (D. Kan. 1994).
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was no genuine dispute that alkaline wastewater was a pollutant. The decision
of whether a substance is a pollutant depends upon its classification as a con-
taminant or irritant.4' As the alkaline wastewater was hazardous to individu-
als, vegetation, and aquatic life, the court concluded that even a narrow con-
struction of the terms contaminant or irritant included a substance with these
destructive properties.42
Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. City of Pittsburg43 was a case involv-
ing direct harm to an individual by an alleged pollutant rather than environ-
mental harm. The court in Westchester Fire Insurance refused to stretch the
definition of pollutant to include insecticide." It ruled that the terms irritant
and contaminant must be construed as substances generally recognized as
causing harm to the environment.4 As the insecticide, malathion, was consid-
ered safe and approved by the government, the court removed it from the
realm of pollutants. '
Courts, therefore, do not have a clear view of what constitutes a pollutant
or a contaminant. 47 Because the issue recently developed in insurance law,
many courts decide it as an issue of first impression. The Tenth Circuit recent-
ly considered this issue for the first time in Regional Bank of Colorado v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance.
B. Regional Bank v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.'
1. Facts
On January 27, 1988, Debra Seibert rented from Regional Bank of Colo-
rado an apartment for herself and her son. Ms. Seibert was pregnant at the
time. Two days after renting the apartment, Ms. Siebert and her son were
admitted to the hospital suffering from carbon monoxide inhalation allegedly
caused by a faulty water heater. Ms. Siebert and her son filed a civil action in
Garfield County District Court against Regional Bank.49
At all relevant times, Regional Bank had in effect a CGL policy issued by
St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company ("St. Paul"), containing a provi-
41. Id. at 1478.
42. Id.
43. 768 F. Supp. 1463 (D. Kan. 1991), aff d, sub nom, Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty Ins.
Co. v. City of Pittsburg, 987 F.2d 1516 (10th Cit. 1993).
44. Id. at 1470.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co. 22 F.3d 1432 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that tri-
chloroethylene was a pollutant even though it was not listed as such by the EPA); Regent Ins. Co.
v. Homes, 835 F. Supp. 579 (D. Kan. 1993) (holding that formic acid causing injury to one child
and no discernable injury to the environment was not a pollutant); Crabtree v. Hayes-Dockside,
Inc., 612 So.2d 249 (La. Ct. App. 1992) (stating that Polyvinyl Chloride (PVC) was an "irritant"
or "contaminant" within the meaning of the pollution exclusion even though it was not listed as
hazardous or toxic); Board of Regents v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 517 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1994)
(holding that asbestos contamination was contemplated by "other irritants, contaminants or pollut-
ants" language of policy due to their irritant effects on the human body).
48. 35 F.3d 494 (10th Cir. 1994).
49. Id. at 495.
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sion excluding coverage for bodily injury, property damage, or medical ex-
penses resulting from pollution at or from the insured's premises, waste site,
or work site."0 Pollution was defined in the policy to mean "actual, alleged,
or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants."'" Pollut-
ants were further defined to mean "any solid, liquid, gaseous, or thermal irri-
tant or contaminant" including smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis,
chemicals, and waste.52
Regional Bank requested coverage under the policy and St. Paul denied,
citing the pollution exclusion. Regional Bank filed a declaratory judgment
action against St. Paul with regard to the coverage and St. Paul's duty to de-
fend on the claim of carbon monoxide poisoning under the CGL policy. The
district court ruled that the pollution exclusion did not bar coverage for the
injuries suffered by the Bank's tenants when they inhaled carbon monoxide
from the faulty heater. The district court stated that the reasonable policyhold-
er would expect to be afforded complete comprehensive coverage under the
CGL policy and a broad interpretation of the exclusion would be unreasonable
because it would exclude coverage for smoke inhalation from a fire but would
not exclude coverage for burns resulting from the same fire. The district court
granted a summary judgment in favor of Regional Bank and St. Paul appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed.
53
2. Opinion
On appeal, the parties agreed that the issue before the court was whether
the policy's pollution exclusion barred coverage for the injuries and damages
caused by the inhalation of carbon monoxide. 4 St. Paul alleged that because
the malfunction of the heater caused an emission of carbon monoxide, its
"absolute pollution exclusion" barred coverage. 5 As a result, the plain and
ordinary meaning of the terms contained in the pollution exclusion barred
coverage for personal injuries caused by carbon monoxide inhalation. 6 St.
Paul further claimed that carbon monoxide is a gaseous "irritant" and coverage
for bodily injury resulting from inhalation on the premises of the insured was
excluded.57
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the emission of carbon monoxide was not
barred by the pollution exclusion clause in the CGL policy.5t Because the
accident occurred in Colorado, the Tenth Circuit followed Colorado law.59
When interpreting insurance contracts, Colorado law recognizes the "reason-
able expectations doctrine," under which the meaning of the terms in an insur-
50. Id. at 495-96.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 495-97.
54. Id. at 498.
55. Id. The absolute pollution exclusion removes the "sudden and accidental" exception. See
supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
56. Regional Bank, 35 F.3d at 498.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 497.
59. Id. at 496 (citing Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)).
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ance policy are determined according to the reasonable expectation of an ordi-
nary policyholder.' The Tenth Circuit determined that the Colorado Supreme
Court would have applied the reasonable expectations doctrine to the terms of
the policy, regardless of whether any ambiguities existed.'
The court stated that the interpretation promoted by St. Paul stretched the
policy's plain meaning. Relying on Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. City
of Pittsburg,3 the Tenth Circuit held that the terms "['irritant' and
'contaminant'] must occur in a setting in which they would be recognized as a
toxic or particularly harmful substance in the industry or by governmental
regulators."' 4
Because the policy at issue left the terms "irritant" and "contaminant"
undefined, the court turned to the dictionary definition of "irritant" and found
that it only further begged the question.' The court concluded that the rea-
sonable policyholder would not understand the policy to bar coverage for
anything that irritates, and that irritant "must be construed in the context of
how it is used in the policy, i.e., defining 'pollutant."'' A reasonably intelli-
gent person might understand carbon monoxide to be a pollutant when emitted
in an environmental or industrial setting, but the reasonable policyholder
would not understand that carbon monoxide emitted from a malfunctioning
heater was pollution.'"
C. Analysis
Regional Bank gave the Tenth Circuit its first opportunity to decide a
pollution exclusion case based upon whether a substance was an "irritant" or
"contaminant" under the CGL policy.' The Tenth Circuit went out of its way
60. Id. (citing Davis v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 989 (Colo. 1986)).
61. Id. at 497. The court did not determine whether the pollution exclusion was ambiguous.
It held that the incident was covered regardless of any ambiguity because an ambiguous policy is
always construed against the insurer in favor of coverage. Id.
62. Id. at 498.
63. 768 F. Supp. at 1470. "The terms 'irritant' and 'contaminant' ... cannot be read in
isolation, but must be contrued as substances generally recognized as polluting the environment."
Id.




68. Prior to Regional Bank, the Tenth Circuit only had occasion to decide cases involving
the pollution exclusion based upon the "sudden and accidental" exception or whether there was a
"discharge" and a subsequent contamination that "arose out of" the discharge. See, e.g., United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrision Grain Co., 999 F.2d 489 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that
the term "sudden and accidental" in pollution exclusion was unambiguous and had an objective
temporal meaning); Anaconda Minerals Co. v. Stoller Chem. Co., 990 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1993)
(holding that discharge at plant was not "sudden and accidental"); Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casu-
alty Ins. Co. v. City of Pittsburg, 987 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that spraying of motor-
ist during mosquito fogging was "sudden and accidental"); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v.
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that under Utah law,
unintentional discharge of harmful pollutants as part of its regular and continuous business prac-
tice of discharging waste products directly into environment was not "sudden and accidental"),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 411 (1992); Broderick Inv. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 954
F.2d 601 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that placement of waste materials into holding containment
1995]
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to hold that the absolute pollution exclusion contained in Regional Bank's
CGL policy with St. Paul did not bar coverage for the inhalation of the carbon
monoxide. This holding may be explained by the fact that St. Paul attempted
to deny coverage for physical injuries sustained by a pregnant woman and her
young child.
To succeed on summary judgment motion, the moving party must demon-
strate no genuine issues of material fact exist and that they are entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.' To avoid summary judgment, the non-moving
party must only show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. In Regional
Bank, the court reviewed de novo the district court's grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of Regional Bank." The court held, as a matter of law, that
under the reasonable expectations doctrine, a reasonable person of ordinary
intelligence would not characterize carbon monoxide emitted from a malfunc-
tioning residential heater as "pollution.'
Courts have split as to whether the classification of a particular substance
as a pollutant or an irritant is a question of fact or of law, and whether the
decision should be based on objective or subjective standards.7" Since what
one person would find an irritant could be pleasant to another, it follows that
the standard should be objective. Moreover, the reasonable expectations doc-
trine is objective by definition. The First Circuit treated the issue as a matter
of law by finding that excessive light and noise alleged in a complaint by
neighbors against a landfill were not pollutants under the definition of the
exclusion.73
In Westchester Fire Insurance Co. v. City of Pittsburg,4 the district court
ruled that there were genuine issues of material fact that precluded a motion
for summary judgment on the issue of whether malathion was a pollutant
within the meaning of two separate insurance policies. Likewise, in Sargent
Construction Co. v. State Auto Insurance Co.,75 the Eighth Circuit ruled that
material issues of fact existed as to whether muriatic acid was an "irritant" or
"contaminant" under the policy, thus precluding summary judgment for the
insurer. In both cases, a genuine issue existed as to whether the substance was
a pollutant in any sense of the word.
In Regional Bank, the court recognized that carbon monoxide is normally
considered a pollutant or contaminant. 76 Applying the reasonable expectations
doctrine, however, the court ruled that a person of ordinary intelligence would
not consider carbon monoxide emissions from a malfunctioning heater as
ponds was "discharge" into or upon land within meaning of pollution exclusion clause, even if
damage to groundwater was unintended), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 189 (1992).
69. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
70. 35 F.3d at 495-96.
71. Id.
72. LATHROP, supra note 18, § 3.07[2][a].
73. Titan Holdings Syndicate, Inc. v. City of Keene, 898 F.2d 265 (Ist Cir. 1990).
74. 794 F. Supp. 353, 355 (D. Kan. 1992), affd sub nom., Pennsylvania Nat'l Mut. Casualty
Ins. Co. v. City of Pittsburg, 987 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1993).
75. 23 F.3d 1324, 1327 (8th Cir. 1994).
76. 35 F.3d at 498.
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pollution within the meaning of the policy." This very easily could have
gone the other way, and it appears the court manufactured a decision based on
the particular facts of the case. The court overlooked that Regional Bank,
rather than the pregnant woman and her child, was the plaintiff in this cover-
age dispute.
Title 25, section 5-502(10) of the Colorado Revised Statutes" defines a
"hazardous substance" as either a substance or a mixture of substances that is,
among other things, an irritant. The statute further defines "irritant" as "any
substance ... which on immediate, prolonged, or repeated contact with normal
living tissue will induce a local inflammatory reaction.""
The Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), under the title of "Air emission
monitoring and reporting," states that "[t]he more common pollutants that are
monitored include ... carbon monoxide. . 0.. 80 Also, under "Housing quali-
ty standards" the CFR states that acceptable criteria for interior air quality
means that "[t]he dwelling unit shall be free from dangerous levels of air
pollution from carbon monoxide."'"
This supports the conclusion that the Tenth Circuit circumvented poten-
tially applicable precedent and support to find coverage for the insured. The
court exceeded its authority by concluding that, in this context, no reasonable
person would view carbon monoxide as pollution. Other courts have, in fact,
treated the threshold issue of whether a substance was a pollutant at all as a
matter of fact for the jury. Although the court conceded that carbon monoxide
is normally a pollutant, it stated that the facts of the case warranted a depar-
ture from this norm. 2 This evidences that reasonable people may differ as to
whether carbon monoxide should be considered pollution. As such, the court
should have followed the example set by other courts and let the jury decide
what a reasonable person would believe.
An additional argument can be made that the "reasonable person of ordi-
nary intelligence" standard is not applicable. CGL policies are not purchased
by the average, unsophisticated consumer unaware of insurance company
practices, but by businesses and corporations. Such entities should be held to a
standard such as the "reasonable corporation" and not the reasonable person of
ordinary intelligence. As evidenced by Regional Bank, the current standard
makes it much easier for courts to favor the policyholder.
The Tenth Circuit declined the opportunity to determine if the policy was
ambiguous because it would hold for coverage either way. 3 Once a policy is
found ambiguous the definition favoring the insured is followed.84 Hence, the
holding would have been more justifiable had the court chosen to find the
77. Id.
78. COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-5-502(10) (1989).
79. Id. § 25-5-502(12).
80. 32 C.F.R. § 650.92(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
81. 24 C.F.R. § 882.109(g)(2) (1994) (emphasis added).
82. Regional Bank, 35 F.3d at 498.
83. Id. at 497.
84. Id. (citing Broadrick Inv. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 954 F.2d 601, 606
(10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 189 (1992)).
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policy ambiguous. The insured could have introduced the history of the exclu-
sion: it was designed to deny coverage to intentional polluters. Because this
was not a case of intentional pollution, the court could have found coverage
that way.
II. INSURABILITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
A. Background
The punitive damages concept developed late in English Common Law
history.8" Punitive damage awards began during the mid-eighteenth century in
England with the dual purpose of compensating injured plaintiffs for non-
physical injuries and punishing the wrongdoer.8 6 By the end of the eighteenth
century, courts in the United States began to recognize the punitive damages
concept.8 In the early 1800s, United States courts broadened compensatory
damages to include mental anguish and pain and suffering, making punitive
damage awards unnecessary to compensate for non-physical injuries." By the
mid-1800s, due to the increasing number of awards for mental anguish, the
focus of punitive damage awards shifted from compensation to punishment
and deterrence.89
The punishment and deterrent theory, which still exists in most American
jurisdictions,' is coming under increasing criticism. One attack is based upon
the concept that civil actions are primarily designed to compensate the plaintiff
rather than punish the wrongdoer.9 Another attack, recognized in at least
eight jurisdictions, questions the utility of punitive damages by noting the
ineffectiveness of punitive damages as a deterrence to misconduct.'
In addition to different interpretations as to the proper function of punitive
damages, jurisdictions also differ on whether public policy allows individuals
to insure themselves against punitive damages.93 Historically, the question of
insurability of punitive damages was simply a matter of contract interpretaion.
Currently, the insurability of punitive damages is a two part determination.94
The first part examines the language of the insurance policy, and the second,
85. Griffen B. Bell & Perry E. Pearce, Punitive Damages and the Tort System, 22 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1, 3 (1987).
86. Id.
87. See, e.g., Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 90 (N.J. 1791).
88. Bell & Pearce, supra note 85, at 4.
89. Id.
90. Gregory J. Sextro, Note, Corporate Insurability of Punitive Damages Arising from Em-
ployee Acts, 11 J. CORP. L. 99, 101 (1985).
91. See Significant Court Decisions, Punitive Damages--Justifications, Criticisms and Limi-
tations, 30 DEF. L.J. 189, 202 (1981).
92. These jurisdictions include Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, Maryland, Oregon, Ten-
nessee, and Vermont. See David A. Sprentall, Insurance Coverage of Punitive Damages, 84 DICK.
L. REV. 221, 229 & nn.59-60 (1979).
93. See generally M. Gino Brogdon, Insuring Punitive Damages: A Closer Look at Public
Policy Analysis, 37 FED'N. INS. CORP. CouNs. Q. 369, 369-83 (1987) (discussing numerous cases
dealing with the insurability of punitive damages).
94. BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK OF INSURANCE COVERAGE
DIsPuTEs § 14.02 (7th ed. 1994).
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assuming coverage for punitive damages, looks to the state's public policy
regarding whether the insured has a right to shift the punitive damage award
to the insurer."- This second part was officially added in the 1960s,9, but the
earliest adoption goes back to 1934 in Colorado.97 If it is determined that the
insurance policy does provide coverage for punitive damages, then it must be
decided whether insurability of punitive damage awards is against public
policy in the state whose law governs.98
In the first part of the test, courts will look to the language of the insur-
ance policy. 9' The provisions relating to punitive damage awards in a liability
insurance policy usually will take one of five basic forms:
(a) To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages arising out of an occur-
rence - i.e., the words "punitive damages" never appear in the policy;
(b) The word "damages" wherever used in this policy shall include
actual damages or statutory damages ... and the word "damages"
shall also include punitive damages;
(c) This policy shall include actual as well as punitive damages,
wherever it is legal for the insurer to provide indemnification for a
punitive damage award;
(d) Exclusion: This policy shall not apply to the commission of an
intentional act for which coverage would otherwise be afforded;
(e) Exclusion: Punitive damages are not covered hereunder."°
The majority of jurisdictions hold that an insurance policy providing coverage
for damages will include coverage for punitive damage awards unless such
coverage is excluded expressly.'' A minority of jurisdictions read "damag-
es" to deny coverage for punitive damages.1
0 2
Most insurance companies provide that the insurer will not provide cover-
age for punitive damages "if to do so would violate the law."'0 3 This type of
provision, option (c) from above, does not differ from (a) or (b) because, if
the insurance is illegal, the court will invalidate the coverage even without the
exclusion. This type of provision, however, is attractive because it affords the
insurer protection against punitive damage awards while still collecting premi-
ums in those jurisdictions whose public policy prohibits insurance against
punitive damages."
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1, 4-5 (Tenn. 1964).
97. See Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 39 P.2d 776, 779 (Colo. 1934). "The injured
will not be allowed to collect from a nonparticipating party for a wrong against the public." Id.
98. OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 94, § 14.02.
99. Id.
100. Id. § 14.02[a].
101. Id.; see also Ridgway v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 578 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1978); Dayton Hud-
son Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d 1155 (Okla. 1980).
102. OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 94, § 14.02[a]; see also Brown v. Western Casualty
and Sur. Co., 484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
103. Katherine B. Posner, Coverage for Punitive Damages: Choice of Law Shell Game, 60
DEF. CouNs. J. 399, 400 (1993).
104. Id.
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Jurisdictions disagree over whether public policy forbids insuring against
punitive damage awards. 5  Northwestern National Casualty Co. v.
McNulty"° represents those cases holding that public policy prohibits insur-
ing against punitive damages. Applying Florida law, the Fifth Circuit held that
punitive damage awards are levied to punish and deter."° Traditionally,
insuring against criminal fines violates public policy, which "should invalidate
any contract of insurance against the civil punishment that punitive damages
represent.""
Ridgway v. Gulf Life Insurance Co."° reaches the opposite conclusion
and holds that insuring against punitive damages does not violate public poli-
cy. In Ridgway, the insurer agreed to indemnify the insured for all sums it
became legally obligated to pay."' Applying Texas law, the Fifth Circuit
held that even though "[t]here may be sound policy reasons why some states
have not allowed punitive damages to be covered by liability insurance," Tex-
as does share in that policy."' The comprehensive and unqualified wording
of the insurance policy stating that the insurer agreed "[t]o indemnify the
insured for all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay"
necessarily included actual and punitive damages." 2 To otherwise construct
the policy would "twist the language of the policy.""' 3 Thus, some jurisdic-
tions value the freedom of contract over the public policy concerns that allow-
ing insurance against punitive damages undermines any punitive effect of
those awards.
The majority of jurisdictions follow the holding of Ridgway and allow
insurance against punitive damages." 4 Some jurisdictions, however, only al-
low insurance against punitive damages where the liability of the insured is
based upon vicarious principles. "' Others have modified the Ridgway hold-
ing by making a distinction between punitive damages awarded for intentional
and unintentional conduct." 6 Jurisdictions which make this distinction permit
insuring against punitive damages for negligent or reckless misconduct, but bar
insurance for intentional misconduct.' '
7
105. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat'l Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962)
(holding that, under Florida law, public policy prohibited insuring against punitive damages);
Ridgway v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 578 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding that, under Texas law,
insurance policy insuring against punitive damages did not violate public policy).
106. 307 F.2d 432, 433 (5th Cir. 1962).
107. Id. at 436.
108. Id. at 440. The court limited its holding to damages awarded to punish and deter and by
punitive damages they did not mean damages awarded for simple negligence. Id. at 442.
109. 578 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (5th Cir. 1978).
110. Id. at 1029.
111. Id. at 1030.
112. Id. at 1029.
113. Id.
114. OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 94, § 14.06. A 1993 survey of the insurability of
punitive damages in various jurisdictions shows that twenty-five jurisdictions permit insurance of
punitive damages. Seven jurisdictions do not allow insuring against punitive damages under any
circumstances. The issue is undetermined in five jurisdictions. Id.
115. Id. Nine jurisdictions allow insuring against punitive damages where the liability of the
insured is vicarious. Id.
116. Id. Five jurisdictions allow insurance of punitive damages except when arising from
intentional wrongs. Id.
117. See, e.g., Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 440 S.W.2d 582 (Ark.
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B. Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co."'
1. Facts
On September 3, 1989, James Martina, employed as an associate manager
of one of Magnum's Little Caesar's Pizza restaurants, raped a female minor
employee who was on duty with Martina. The victim and her parents brought
suit in Oklahoma state court against Martina for assault and against Magnum
for negligent hiring, supervision, and retention of Martina. Evidence at the
state trial showed that Martina had a prior felony conviction for attempted
sexual assault on a child in New York and that Martina lied on his Magnum
employment application regarding his criminal record. Evidence was also in-
troduced showing that Martina had repeatedly sexuallly harassed other em-
ployees and that some of the young female employees refused to work closing
because it would require them to work alone with Martina." 9
Prior to the rape, Martina's coworkers apprised store managers of
Martina's misconduct. One of the store managers complained to the area su-
pervisor who in turn spoke to the area director. One of the store managers
reprimanded Martina on three separate occasions regarding his misconduct,
and the other manager issued a written warning that was sent to the home
office to be placed in Martina's personnel file. While this misconduct violated
written policy against sexual harassment, Martina was neither suspended nor
fired. At trial, the jury returned a verdict against Martina and Magnum for
$750,000 each in compensatory damages. In addition, Magnum was assessed
$750,000 in punitive damages, while Martina was assessed $5 million in puni-
tive damages. 2
Magnum was insured by Continental Casualty Co. ("CNA") under a poli-
cy that did not expressly exclude coverage for punitive damages. In response
to a request for coverage, CNA sent a letter to Magnum reserving its rights
and advising Magnum that CNA would provide a defense, but a potential for
uninsured punitive damages existed. 2 '
Following the award against it, Magnum filed this declaratory judgment
action against CNA asking the court to decide whether the CNA policy cov-
ered the award of punitive damages. Magnum also sought damages against
CNA for an alleged breach of good faith and fair dealing.'22 The district
court entered a partial summary judgment for CNA in the federal declaratory
judgment action, and ruled that Oklahoma public policy prohibits insuring
against punitive damages except in cases of vicarious liability. Consequently,
1969) (allowing insurance of punitive damages except when rising from an intentional tort); Abbie
Uriguen Oldsmobile Buick, Inc. v. United States Fire Ins. Co., 511 P.2d 783 (Idaho 1973) (hold-
ing a negligent driver insured); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 383 S.W.2d 1 (Tenn.
1964) (allowing insurance of punitive damages from wrongs not intentionally inflicted).
118. 36 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1994).
119. Id. at 1495-96.
120. Id. at 1496-97.
121. Id. at 1496. Plaintiffs offered to settle against Magnum for $495,000 and, even though
Magnum requested CNA to settle, CNA refused to offer more than $350,000. Id.
122. For a discussion regarding the bad faith claim see infra notes 200-17 and accompanying
text.
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the court denied insurance coverage to Magnum because the punitive damages
award was based on Magnum's direct liability. The court also denied CNA's
motion for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict, as
genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether CNA's conduct consti-
tuted bad faith. The jury ultimately awarded Magnum $750,000 in compensa-
tory damages and $750,000 in punitive damages on its bad faith claim.'23
Magnum appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment
for CNA that denied insurance coverage for the punitive damage award. CNA
appealed the federal judgment against it on the bad faith claim.'24
2. Majority Opinion
The issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the punitive damage
award was imposed upon Magnum under vicarious liability principles or
whether it was imposed based upon Magnum's own gross negligence.'25 Ap-
plying Oklahoma law in a de novo review of the grant of partial summary
judgment in favor of CNA, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
26
Oklahoma public policy prohibits the insurability of punitive damages
except where the insured has been held accountable based upon the principles
of vicarious liability. 27 The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Dayton Hudson
Corp. v. American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. 2 ' reasoned that because
punitive damages punish and deter wrongdoers, allowing the wrongdoer to
shift liability for punitives to its insurer defeated that purpose."' In contrast,
vicarious liability cases do not involve the conduct of the policyholder, so
public policy does not prevent insurance coverage of punitive damages in
these instances. 3°
To determine which liability theory the jury based its award of punitive
damages upon, the Tenth Circuit examined the totality of the jury instructions
given."' The only jury instructions given concerned negligent hiring and re-
tention:3 2 An employer's liability for negligent supervision and hiring is sep-
arate and distinct from an employer's liability under respondeat superior."'
As such, the court held that all of the jury instructions "indicate[d] that it was
Magnum's own negligence, by violating its nondelegable duty by its hiring
123. Magnum Foods, 36 F.3d at 1496-97.
124. Id. at 1497. CNA also appealed the order awarding Magnum attorney fees. Magnum
cross-appealed the same order as it denied prejudgment interest. Both were reversed and remand-
ed. Id. at 1509.
125. Id. at 1498.
126. Id. at 1497, 1509.
127. Id. at 1497 (citing Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 621 P.2d
1155, 1156 (Okla. 1980). In Dayton Hudson the Oklahoma Supreme Court followed the McNulty
rule disallowing insurance coverage for punitive damage awards. Dayton Hudson, 621 P.2d at
1160.
128. 621 P.2d 1155 (Okla. 1980).
129. Id. at 1160.
130. Id.
131. Magnum Foods, 36 F.3d at 1499.
132. Id.




and retention of Martina, that provided the basis for the punitive liability im-
posed by the state court jury and not respondeat superior for the liability of its
employees."'34 Consequently, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the case fell
within the Dayton Hudson rule disallowing insurance coverage of punitive
damages,'35 and that the district court was correct in concluding that Mag-
num was directly liable.'36
3. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Kelly dissented from the court's opinion. Intially, Judge Kelly noted
that as a corporation, Magnum was responsible for the breach of a nondelega-
ble duty. 37 However, "even though duties are nondelegable, liability for their
breach has no automatic characterization as 'direct' because liability may arise
vicariously."' 38 He felt that "an unequivocal showing of actual corporate
knowledge" was necessary to decide corporate liability in this case. 39 There
was no evidence suggesting that any officer of director of Magnum had actual
knowledge of Martina's misconduct."4
Judge Kelly's main contention was that due to precedent, 4' the jury
could have based the award of punitive damages on a vicarious liability theo-
ry.42 The evidence showed that only the store managers had knowledge of
Martina's misconduct, not that any officer or director of Magnum had knowl-
edge.'43 If correct, then the award would have been based upon principles of
vicarious liability and not direct liability.
C. Analysis
Once the court determined that the punitive damage award against Mag-
num was based upon Magnum's liability for negligent hiring and retention and
not upon vicarious liability, the Tenth Circuit applied Oklahoma law, followed
established precedent, and held that public policy prohibited insurance against
punitive damages for direct liability. The court feared two unwanted
consequnces of insuring punitive damages: 1) the punishment and deterrent
purpose would be defeated; and 2) the burden of punitive damages would
ultimately fall upon the public in the form of higher insurance premiums."4
There are several arguments in favor of the insurability for punitive dam-
ages: (a) the sanctity of private contracts; (b) the insurer has elected to accept
134. Id. at 1501.
135. Id. at 1502.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1510 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1511.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See Dayton Hudson, 621 P.2d at 1161 (declining to make a per se rule that would re-
quire a corporation to "stand directly liable and uninsurable for punitive damages stemming from
the torts of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision, regardless of which employees have actual
knowledge of the wrongdoer's behavior").
142. Magnum Foods, 36 F.3d at 1511 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1498.
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the premium dollar for the coverage afforded; (c) the potential danger of bank-
ruptcy of insureds and businesses if denied the pass-along right; and (d) the
presence or absence of insurance coverage does not realistically serve as a
deterrent. 45
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma had previously followed the reasonable
expectations doctrine when construing insurance contracts."4 The Tenth Cir-
cuit departed from this doctrine here because Oklahoma public policy prohibits
insurance of punitive damages based upon direct liability. 47 The insurance
contract did not specify on what basis, if any, it would provide coverage for
punitive damages. In fact, the insurance contract made no mention of exclud-
ing coverage for punitive damages.
It is reasonable to expect a corporation to know the law in the jurisdiction
in which it is based. It is also reasonable, however, that Magnum, when look-
ing only to its policy, would not have understood that no coverage existed for
its direct liability but would be afforded in cases of vicarious liability. Thus,
this policy should have explicitly set forth this distinction. Nonetheless, the
court denied Magnum's reasonable expectations in regard to the contract for
insurance and allowed CNA to accept premiums and then deny coverage."
These are policy concerns that seem just as important, if not more so, than
those attached to the insurability of punitive damages. Courts are allowing
companies to manipulate the system.
Presently, the potential exists for a choice of law shell game. Depending
upon the choice of law theory a particular court follows, 49 and assuming the
insurance policy does not specifically exclude coverage, punitive damages may
or may not be covered based upon the public policy of the chosen state. This
forum shopping permits the insurance company to accept premiums paid by
the insured for coverage of all sums the insured becomes legally obligated to
pay, then allows the insurer to deny coverage due to the application of a par-
ticular state's public policy. An insured pays for coverage and then is later
denied that coverage. This potential for manipulation of the law and the resul-
tant uncertainty has the potential to increase rates, transaction costs, and per-
haps coverage disputes. 50 Courts or legislatures should force insurance com-
panies to include a specific exclusion for punitive damages in policies. Other
possibilities, such as requiring insurers to warn insureds that coverage for
punitives is not available under the law of many states, would not adequately
145. OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 94, § 14.02[b][1].
146. See, e.g., Phillips v. Estate of Greenfield, 859 P.2d 1101 (Okla. 1993). The court held
that to construe the contract as providing coverage would require a rewriting of the clear language
of the policy or a tortured reading of the plain language of the exclusion and to follow either
course "would be to negate the reasonable expectations of the parties as expressed in their con-
tract .... "Id. at 1106.
147. Magnum Foods, 36 F.3d at 1497.
148. Id. at 1502.
149. To establish the governing law of a contract, five general choice of law theories have
been developed by United States courts: "place of making" rule; "most significant relationship"
test; "center of gravity" test; "governmental interest" analysis; and "choice-influencing factors"
approach. Posner, supra note 103, at 400-01.
150. Id. at 399.
[Vol. 72:3
INSURANCE LAW
solve the problem because insurance companies continue to accept premiums
for coverage they will not provide.
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Magnum Foods is confusing. In discussing
whether the award was based upon vicarious liability, the Court found "[a]ll of
these instructions indicate that it was Magnum's own negligence, by violating
its nondelegable duty by its hiring and retention of Martina, that provided the
basis for the punitive liability imposed."'' One jury instruction stated the
jury could assess punitives against Magnum if it found Magnum's conduct
amounted to "Fraud; Oppression; Gross Negligence; Malice (actual or pre-
sumed); Evil Intent; Reckless or Wanton disregard of another's rights."'52
The court said only that this instruction put the question of whether Magnum's
liability was direct or vicarious in proper perspective.'53 While direct liability
was not one of the prerequisites for awarding punitive damages, the court does
not discuss whether Magnum's conduct could properly be considered mali-
cious, grossly negligent, etc.
Furthermore, the dissent correctly states there was no record evidence
suggesting that any officer or director of Magnum had actual knowledge of
Martina's misconduct. 4 The evidence on appeal showed only that the store
managers had actual knowledge of Martina's misconduct.'55 Having this
knowledge and failing to act accordingly amounted to negligence on the part
of those managers. Basing Magnum's liability, and the subsequent punitive
damage award against them, on the store managers' negligence would be an
example of vicarious liability as there was no showing of actual corporate
knowledge.'56 Punitive damage awards based upon vicarious liability are in-
surable.'57
The record does not support the court's grant of summary judgment in
favor of CNA. Rather, the court should have reversed the summary judgment
grant and remanded the case for trial to allow the intoduction of evidence
sufficient to decide the basis of liability. Genuine issues of material fact ex-
isted as to whether there was actual corporate knowledge, which precluded the
granting of summary judgment.
III. PUNITIVE DAMAGES AND BAD FAITH
A. Background
Bad faith in insurance law emerged as one of the dominant legal topics in
1993.58 According to a recent survey of top litigation awards, two insurance
bad faith cases, Amoco Chemical Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds of
151. Magnum Foods, 36 F.3d at 1501 (emphasis added).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 1502.
154. Id. at 1511 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
155. See id. at 1496.
156. Id. at 1511 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 1497.
158. J. Stratton Shartel, Breach of Contract, Bad Faith Verdicts Dominate 1993 Top Verdicts
List, 8 No. 2 INSIDE LIT1G. I Feb.Mar. 1994.
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London 59 and Hedrick v. Setry Insurance Co., 6 were among the top ten
verdicts of the year.'6'
Bad faith liability for insurance companies commenced with two landmark
decisions in California, Crisci v. Security Insurance Co., 62 and Fletcher v.
Western National Life Insurance Co. 63 In Crisci, the court stated that an in-
surer owes an implied-in-law duty of good faith and fair dealing to its in-
sured.' A violation of that duty sounds in tort, notwithstanding that the
violation may also constitute a breach of contract.'65 The duty in the case of
a liability insurance policy includes the duty to act in good faith when attempt-
ing to settle third party claims against the insured."6
In Fletcher, the court held that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
existing in every insurance contract requires that neither party act to injure the
other's right to receive the agreement's benefits.'67 California courts have
allowed punitive damage awards against insurers for breaching the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing."6 California courts also hold that the
implied covenant is not an obligation stemming from the contract but is an
obligation imposed by the law and therefore a breach will sound in tort. 69
Thus, damages are not limited to strict contractual damages. 7 '
The rule from Crisci has been followed by the Seventh Circuit in Craft v.
Economy Fire & Casualty Co.'' and other cases.'72 For example, the court
in Craft held that although the insurance company did not control the in-
sured's litigation, the insurer can still be required to act in good faith based
upon the insured's reasonable expectations and the unequal bargaining posi-
tions."' The court further held that punitive damages could be levied against
insureds.'74
159. No. BC030755 (L.A. County Super. Ct. Dec. 7, 1993).
160. No. 96-128100-90 (Tarrant County, Tex., Dist. Ct. Dec. 10, 1993).
161. Shartel, supra note 158. The $425.6 million dollar jury award in Amoco Chemical Co.
was the second largest punitive damage award in 1993. The $102.7 million dollar jury award, in
Hendrick, was the tenth largest punitive damages award in 1993.
Large punitive damage amounts, in general, have been approved by the United States Su-
preme Court. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 113 S. Ct. 2711, 2718-23 (1993)
(raising the spector of Due Process Clause limits but approving a $10 million punitive damage
award, which was 526 times the amount of the actual award, as not being "grossly excessive").
162. 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
163. 89 Cal. Rptr. 78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1970).
164. Crisci, 426 P.2d at 176.
165. Id. at 178-79.
166. Id. at 176.
167. Fletcher, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 93; see also Silberg v. California Life Ins. Co., 521 P.2d 1103
(Cal. 1974).
168. See Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141 (Cal. 1979), cert. denied and ap-
peal dismissed, 445 U.S. 912 (1980).
169. Silberg, 521 P.2d at 1108-09.
170. Id. at 1109.
171. 572 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1978). In Craft, the insured brought suit under an automobile
liability insurance policy against the insurance company for tortious breach of contract in its han-
dling of the claim. Id. at 566-67.
172. See, e.g., Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1 (7th Cir. 1972).
173. Craft, 572 F.2d at 569.
174. Id. at 574. Indiana law allows punitive damages for the tortious breach of an insurance
contract if the insurer's conduct amounts to malice, gross negligence, or oppression and the
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The Eighth Circuit, applying Iowa law in Northwestern National Insur-
ance Co. v. Pope,"' recognized an independent action in tort when an insur-
er acted in bad faith to settle a first party claim for property damage. Under
Iowa law, if the cause of action against the insurer lies in tort as well as con-
tract, punitive damage awards can be made to the insured if the insurer acts
with malice, fraud, gross negligence or commits an illegal act.'76 The court
in Pope, however, held that the handling of the claims by the insurer did not
amount to malice or impropriety of the type that would justify punitive dam-
ages under Iowa law.' The delay in settling the claim was due to late fil-
ing, time allowed for negotiations, and the fact that plaintiff changed attorneys
twice during the process.'
There are a number of jurisdictions that do not recognize the tort of bad
faith as an independent cause of action and therefore do not allow punitive
damages.'79 Kansas, a Tenth Circuit state, is one such jurisdiction.' The
Supreme Court of Kansas, in Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Insurance
Co.,' ' held that an insurer, in defending and settling third party claims
against its insured, owed a duty to its insured to act in good faith. Kansas law,
however, does not recognize bad faith as a separate tort, and therefore denies
punitive damages." 2
In Thompson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.," 3 the Tenth Circuit,
applying Oklahoma law, followed Crisci' and held that an insurance
company's violation of its implied duty of good faith and fair dealing will
give rise to an action in tort for which punitive damages may be sought.'85
In Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co.'86 the court, also
applying Oklahoma law, ruled that the presence of an uninsurable punitive
damages claim did not allow the insurer to relinquish its obligation to act in
good faith.' In remanding for a new trial, the court further ruled that the
jury should be instructed not to consider the payment by Magnum to settle a
punitive damage award when deciding compensatory damages on the bad faith
claim against CNA.' 8
deterrent effect of the punitive damages would serve the public interest. Id.
175. 791 F.2d 649 (8th Cir. 1986).
176. Id. at 652.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See, e.g., Wilson v. Colonial Penn Life Ins. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1208 (D. Minn. 1978)
(applying Minnesota law); Farris v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 587 P.2d 1015 (Or. 1978).
180. See Spencer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Ins. Co., 611 P.2d 149 (Kan. 1980).
181. Id. at 155.
182. Id. at 158.
183. 34 F.3d 932 (10th Cir 1994).
184. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967).
185. Thompson, 34 F.3d at 942-43.
186. 36 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1994).
187. Id. at 1503.
188. Id. at 1506.
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B. Thompson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co."8 9
1. Facts
On June 6, 1991, an intentionally set fire destroyed the Thompsons' unoc-
cupied rental house in Oklahoma. The Thompsons filed a claim with State
Farm Insurance under their policy covering the house, its contents, and the
loss of rental value. State Farm sent a claims representative to review the
Thompsons' financial condition to determine if they had a motive to set the
fire. As part of the investigation, and as required by the policy, the Thompsons
gave statements under oath.'9
During the investigation, the Thompsons told the claims representative,
Morty Sands ("Sands"), that the sale of their jewelry store business, for be-
tween $700,000 and $750,000, was imminent. The recorded statement of the
realtor, Helen Morris ("Morris"), with whom the business was listed not only
negated any imminency of a sale but stated that there had been no offers or
serious lookers. 9'
Morris testified at trial that she listed the building alone for $275,000 and
the entire property, including the jewelry business inventory, for $775,000.
She denied telling the Thompsons she had a buyer willing to pay $700,000 to
$750,000 for the store. Morris testified that the only offer was one of $90,000
for the real estate. After some appraisal differences, Morris inquired as to the
valuation for tax purposes and, at that time, learned that Orville Munson
("Munson") owned the property and building, while the Thompsons owned
only the business.'92
During the examination, the Thompsons told Sands of another "imminent"
sale involving stock in Honduran Gold Mines, Ltd. ("Honduran"). The
Thompsons' lawyer gave Morris a phone number for Honduran that was no
longer in service and upon investigation, she could not find the company's
current location.
93
Jerry Griffin ("Griffin"), the President of Honduran, in his deposition
entered at trial, testified that on the day before the fire, the Thompsons had
shown up unannounced at his home in Dallas. At that time, Griffin told the
Thompsons that two offers to purchase Honduran had been rejected. Griffin
did state in his deposition that at the time of the Thompsons' visit he believed
that "an infusion of cash was likely" due to the interest of another buyer.
Munson, also a stockholder in Honduran, testified that as of June 1991, he
also thought there would be a sale.' 94
As a result, State Farm did not honor the Thompsons' insurance claim
under the belief the Thompsons had started the fire. 95 The Thompsons
brought suit against State Farm to collect on the insurance policy for the
189. 34 F.3d 932 (10th Cir. 1994).
190. Id. at 935.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 935-36.
193. Id. at 936.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 942.
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building and for other damages arising from State Farm's handling of the
Thompsons' claim. A jury returned a verdict in favor of State Farm, and the
Thompsons appealed on several grounds. One of the grounds on appeal was




The district court's refusal to submit to the jury the issue of punitive
damages was, in effect, the equivalent of a judgment as a matter of law on
that issue in favor of State Farm. 97 The Tenth Circuit ruled that the district
judge correctly stated Oklahoma law on the issue. 9
Under Oklahoma law, in order to present the issue of punitive damages to
a jury, the trial judge must determine if there is sufficient evidence of "fraud,
oppression, gross negligence or malice, actual or presumed" from "wilful
acts.... . "The record in the case amply discloses evidence in support of the
legitimate belief of State Farm that it had no obligation to honor the
Thompsons' claim."22" The actions of State Farm in investigating the validity
of its belief, cannot, as a matter of law, be said to have been egregious enough
to constitute bad faith or to allow the award of punitive damages."'
C. Magnum Foods, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co.2"2
1. Facts
For a complete discussion of the facts please refer to section II(b)(1).
2. Opinion
The Tenth Circuit ruled that where compensatory and uninsurable punitive
damages were sought and the insurer ("CNA") defended the entire suit, the
mere presence of a claim for uninsurable punitive damages did not allow CNA
to relinquish its obligation to act in good faith in its handling of the entire
case.
203
The parties disagreed as to whether the presence of a claim for uninsur-
able punitive damages abrogated the insurer's obligation to act in good
faith. 24 The court stated that an insurer's good faith requirements in the
circumstances of this case differ from the requirements in a typical excess
liability case. 5 In the typical case, Oklahoma law places a heavy duty on
196. Id. at 934. The court concluded that all the grounds for appeal were without merit. Id.
197. Id. at 942.
198. Id.




202. 36 F.3d 1491 (10th Cir. 1994).
203. Id. at 1506.
204. Id. at 1503.
205. Id.
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the insurer to determine if the claim against the insured should be settled, if
possible, within policy limits.2" The situtation is different when the insured
assumes the risk due to exposure to uninsurable punitive damages. The
insurer's failure to settle merely deprives the insured of a chance to avoid the
possibility of punitive damages for its own conduct. 7
Regardless of the conduct of the insurer, punitive damages might still be
awarded due to the insured's blameworthy behavior.2"' The court agreed that
the "risk that a wrongdoer will suffer the consequences of his own malfea-
sance is not one that may be shifted to an insurer." An insurer, however, is
not insulated from bad faith in handling the entire case whenever uninsurable
punitive damages are sought.2"
CNA claimed that the district court improperly denied its motion for
directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the bad faith
claim asserted by Magnum. The Tenth Circuit held that CNA was not entitled
to judgment as a matter of law, but that CNA was entitled to a new trial to
determine if its conduct violated its duty of good faith. The basis for this
violation was that the bad faith claim judgment in favor of Magnum improper-
ly included the $600,000 Magnum paid to settle the punitive damage
award.
210
In the new trial, the court held that the jury should be instructed not to
consider the payment of $600,000 by Magnum to settle the punitive damage
award on the bad faith claim. The jury should further be instructed that Okla-




Allowing the punitive damage award against the insured to be considered
by the jury in assessing compensatory damages for bad faith by the insurer in
effect shifts the liability for the punitive damages to the insurer, which violates
Oklahoma public policy.2 12 Therefore, at the new trial, the court held that
Magnum may seek compensatory damages based on any injury but may not
include the payment of $600,000.2 3 Adequate evidence existed to submit the
compensatory damages issue to the jury regardless of the $600,000 Magnum
paid to settle the puntive damages award. '4 In the course of the new trial,
the district judge must determine if there is sufficient evidence to justify sub-
mitting the claim for punitive damages against CNA to the jury.2"5
206. Id. at 1504 (citing Hazelrigg v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co., 241 F.2d 871, 873
(10th Cir. 1957)).
207. Id. (quoting Soto v. State Farm Ins. Co., 635 N.E.2d 1222, 1225 (N.Y. 1994)).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1505-06.
210. Id. at 1502.
211. Id. at 1506.
212. Id. at 1507 (citing Dayton Hudson, 621 P.2d at 1156; Oliver v. Producers Gas Co., 795
P.2d 1090, 1091-92 (Okla. Ct. App. 1990)).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1508.
215. Id. The court expressed no opinion as to whether it was proper for the district judge to




The dissent opted for an approach that would "not recognize any claim
based upon a bad faith refusal to settle where policy limits were not exceeded
and the only exposure to the insured was for an uncovered event. 21 6 Further,
the dissent argued that it was inconsistent to refuse to include, as compensato-
ry damages, damages that flow both logically and naturally from a bad faith
refusal to settle, while at the same time requiring that good faith consideration
be given to the insured's concerns over possible exposure to uninsured puni-
tive damages.2 ' The dissent felt that if an insurer does not settle at a reason-
able offer within the policy limits, and this failure to settle subjects the insured
to liability not included in policy coverage, "the insurer should be responsible
for any losses incurred as a result of its bad faith refusal to settle." ' The
settlement amount demanded of the insurer, however, must be reasonable,
taking the injuries into account as well as the covered exposure and the final
jury verdict on the covered portions."9
D. Analysis
In Thompson, the Tenth Circuit correctly affirmed the district court's
refusal to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury, even though, in
effect, it was tantamount to a judgment as a matter of law for State Farm.
Under Oklahoma law, it is the trial judge's duty to determine, as a matter of
law, if sufficient evidence exists as to whether there was oppression, fraud,
malice, or gross negligence from willful acts to submit the punitive damage
issue to the jury.22 Due to the evidence presented, it was reasonable for
State Farm to believe it had no obligation to honor the Thompsons' claim.22
This was not a difficult case for the court to decide. It was established defini-
tively that the fire was intentionally set.222 State Farm's belief that it had no
obligation was legitimized by the evidence, and its conduct could not amount
to gross negligence or malice, both of which are required for an award of
punitive damages.223 In addition, the jury found no bad faith on State Farm's
behalf and thus, even if submitted to the jury, punitive damages could not
have been awarded.224
The court's ruling in Magnum Foods presents a more difficult issue. An
insurance company has to act not only in its own best interest but also in the
best interest of its insured as well.225 Sometimes these interests conflict.
There is sound logic in the court's ruling that where compensatory and unin-
216. Id. at 1512 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 1513.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. 34 F.3d at 942.
221. Id. at 943.
222. Id. at 935.
223. Id. at 943.
224. Id.
225. 36 F.3d at 1504 (quoting American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. G. A. Nichols Co., 173
F.2d 830, 832 (10th Cir. 1949)).
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surable punitive damages are sought, and the insurance company agreed to
defend the entire suit, the mere presence of a claim for punitive damages does
not allow the insurance company to relinquish its obligation to act in good
faith in its handling of the entire case.226 To hold otherwise would allow the
insurer to disregard the best interests of the insured and take only its own best
interest into account, thus violating the basic concept of insurance law articu-
lated above. This would, in effect, legitimize an insurer's bad faith and insu-
late it from recourse.
The dissent validly notes a flaw in the majority's opinion that the
$600,000 paid by Magnum to settle the punitive damages claim should not be
included in the compensatory damages claim against CNA. The punitive dam-
ages Magnum paid flowed logically and naturally from a bad faith refusal to
settle.227 It seems at odds to exclude this in compensatory damages while at
the same time requiring, as good faith, that fair consideration be given to the
insured's concerns due to exposure to the possibility of uninsured punitive
damages. 28
The majority's attempt to distinguish the instant situation from that of a
typical excess liability case is not compelling. The victim made reasonable
settlement offers that were well within policy limits and did not include puni-
tive damages.229 In fact, the offers were far less than the eventual jury
award. 3° Acceptance of the settlement offers would have been in the best in-
terests of both Magnum and CNA. For whatever reason, CNA rolled the dice
and subjected Magnum to a considerable punitive damage award. While the
court held that the punitive damages stemmed from Magnum's own
wrongdoing,' the punitive damages would have been avoided had CNA
acted in good faith and settled. Thus, the punitive damage award was properly
included in Magnum's compensatory damages claim as it was directly related
to Magnum's failure to act in good faith by not settling the case.
CONCLUSION
During the 1993-94 survey period, the Tenth Circuit addressed, for the
first time, what constitutes an "irritant" or "contaminant" under the "pollution
exclusion" in a comprehensive general liability insurance policy.2 32 The
Tenth Circuit held that although carbon monoxide is a pollutant in the environ-
mental context, a reasonable person would not understand carbon monoxide to
be a pollutant in the context of insurance coverage. 231 It can be argued, how-
ever, that it is just as likely that a reasonable person would believe carbon
monoxide to be a pollutant in any context. This potential factual dispute indi-
226. Id. at 1506.
227. Id. at 1513.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1507 (victim offered to settle for $495,000).
230. Id. at 1496 (jury found insured liable for compensatory damages in the amount of
$750,000 and punitive damages in the amount of $750,000).
231. Id. at 1497-98.




cates that the case should have been submitted to the jury and not decided on
summary judgment. The Tenth Circuit showed that it will uphold coverage in
the context of residential pollution, while it will be less inclined to do so in an
environmental pollution case.
With respect to punitive damages, the Tenth Circuit followed established
precedent that Oklahoma public policy prohibits insuring against punitive
damages based upon direct liability. 34 The court ruled that an insurer's rea-
sonable belief that it was under no obligation to honor a claim precluded an
award of punitive damages.235 Further, a punitive damage award against the
insured, when the insurer refused to settle, may not be considered when




234. Magnum Foods, 36 F.3d at 1497.
235. Thompson, 34 F.3d at 943.
236. Magnum Foods, 36 F.3d at 1506.
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